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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Mr. Disch, on May 13, 1998, is considered 
the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah Code Sec. 78-2a-3(e). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 1998, within 30 days of the entry of 
judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts of guilty. 
The Appellate Court must review all evidence and inferences in light most 
favorable of the verdict. Reversal is appropriate only when evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). 
II. Whether the State is barred from filing a new action after dismissal of the 
first criminal action after bindover at Preliminary Hearing on a Motion to 
Dismiss filed by the County Attorney for the reason "it [the case] will be 
refiled with a different enhancement." Review on due process 
considerations. Review for correctness. 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah provides, in relevant part, that: 
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In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel... to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him ... and the right to 
appeal in all cases ... The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself. 
Amendment Five of the Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law. 
Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of law. 
Utah Code Section 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part, that: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such 
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
Utah Code Section 58-37-8(2) provides, in relevant part, that: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection. 
Utah Code Section 58-37-8(2) provides, in relevant part, that: 
2 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) 
while inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied by 
any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any 
public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to 
a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection 
(2)(b). 
Utah Code Section 76-2-101 provides, in relevant part, that: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by 
law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, 
or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, 
as the definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. 
Utah Code Section 76-2-102 provides, in relevant part, that: 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable 
mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. 
An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof 
of any culpable mental state. 
Utah Code Section 76-2-103 provides, in relevant part, that: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
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knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A- NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Mr. Disch appeals from his conviction following a Jury Trial of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance Within a Correctional Facility in violation of Utah Code Sec. 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), enhanced to a second-degree felony under 58-37-8(2)(c), U.C.A. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
This appeal involves two separate criminal cases in the Seventh District Court in 
and for Grand County. 
The first case, 9717-26, was filed on or about February 11, 1997. The Defendant 
was charged in a one-county Information with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug-Free Zone, a second-degree felony, in violation of 
Sec. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). The charge arose from an incident occurring on or about 
February 5, 1997, and was based on evidence received from Deputy Zane Lammert 
and Detective Curt Brewer, both members of the Grand County Sheriffs Office. 
See Statement of Probable Cause, Addendum A. 
Mr. Disch's First Appearance was on April 16, 1997. His Preliminary Hearing was 
July 2. After Preliminary Hearing, he was bound over. Defendant pled Not Guilty at his 
Arraignment and Jury Trial was scheduled for September 19. On September 18 the State 
moved the Court to dismiss the matter "for the reason it will be refiled with a different 
enhancement." An Order granting the State's Motion was signed and filed on September 
23. Copies of the Information, Motion and Order of Dismissal are included as the 
Addenda B, C and D. 
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On September 24, 1997, Mr. Disch was charged in a one-count Information with 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Within a Correctional Facility. (R-1) The 
Information regarding the instant case alleged Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed methamphetamine while inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied by 
a correctional facility or public jail. Because of the allegation involving the correctional 
facility, the crime was enhanced from a third to a second-degree felony by Section 
58-37-8(2)(c). After a First Appearance on October 15, 1997, Preliminary Hearing was 
scheduled for December 8, 1997. 
No new testimony was presented at the Preliminary Hearing. The testimony from 
the prior Preliminary Hearing in Case No. 9717-26 was incorporated, Defendant 
preserved his Brickey rights, and he was bound over for Jury Trial on March 30, 1998. 
Prior to trial Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or Quash Bindover (R-14), 
supported by a Memorandum. (R-15) The Court issued a Ruling denying the Motion on 
March 23 (R-20), holding that Brickey applies only to those cases where the magistrate 
refused to hold the Defendant to answer to the charges for lack of probable cause (R-19). 
The Ruling further held that while the prosecutor's discretion to dismiss prior to jeopardy 
attaching is not unlimited, it was not abused in this case since (1) the Defendant had an 
opportunity to agree to a pre-trial amendment to the Information; (2) the underlying facts 
have not changed; and (3) the magistrate's bindover led the prosecutor to believe that his 
original theory was valid. (R-20) 
In both matters the magistrate and judge was the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, the 
State was represented by William L. Benge, Grand County Attorney, and Defendant was 
represented by William L. Schultz, who continues as counsel for Appellant. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
5 
Sentencing was on May 13, 1998. At that time the trial court ordered Mr. Disch to 
be committed to the Utah State Prison for one to fifteen years. A Findings, Judgment and 
Commitment was filed that same day. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 1998. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Deputy Zane Lammert of the Grand County Sheriffs Office works in the Grand 
County Jail processing inmates in and out and takes care of inmates (TR-6). (Although 
the first page of the transcript filed with the Court of Appeals by the Court reporter is 
numbered "116", the remainder of the document has no separate record numbers. 
References to the transcript are hereinafter designated by TR- with the following number 
a reference to the page number of the transcript.) Deputy Lammert was on duty on 
February 5, 1997. (TR-7) He was contacted by the bailiff to come to the Courtroom to 
take custody of Lynn Disch. (TR-7) Mr. Disch was being incarcerated on a separate 
matter. While Deputy Lammert was booking Defendant, he had him empty his pockets on 
the countertop. (TR-7) 
The booking area is within the confines of the jail. (TR-8) 
The countertop where Mr. Disch emptied his pockets had nothing on it but a 
telephone, bolted down and off to the side. (TR-9) Deputy Lammert testified there was no 
possibility items from another inmate could have been on the countertop. (TR-9, -10) 
When Mr. Disch emptied his pockets there was quite a bit of stuff. (TR-10) During 
an inventory of those items, Deputy Lammert found a small bindle of paper rolled up into 
a ball about the size of a quarter inch. (TR-10, -11) Deputy Lammert later corrected 
himself saying it was not a bindle, just a small piece of paper rolled into a ball. (TR-11) It 
was marked as Exhibit 3. (TR-13) 
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The deputy did not see Exhibit 3 come out of Mr. Disch's pocket. (TR-12). Upon 
inspection Deputy Lammert discovered Exhibit 3 contained a pinkish-white colored rock. 
(TR-12) 
The contents of Exhibit 3 were submitted to the State Crime Lab by Deputy 
Lammert for analysis. (TR-13) 
Access to the area where Defendant was booked was not exclusive to Deputy 
Lammert. (TR-17) One other person was booked before Defendant. (TR-18) 
Items are placed on the countertop where Deputy Lammert testified the bindle was 
found. (TR-21) 
Deputy Lammert prepared an inventory of the personal property in Mr. Disch's 
possession. The inventory did not list Exhibit 3. Proper procedure was for the officer to 
list contraband on an inventory and confiscate it. (TR-22) Mr. Disch was never 
confronted with Exhibit 3. (TR-23) Deputy Lammert never saw Exhibit 3 on Mr. Disch. 
(TR-23) Mr. Disch was frisked before he was escorted to the jail and Deputy Lammert 
watched him empty his pockets. (TR-24) Deputy Lammert never saw Exhibit 3 in Mr. 
Disch's possession. 
The deputy clarified that Exhibit 3 was really more just a piece of wadded paper 
than a bindle. (TR-31) 
Gary Hunter Naisbitt of the State Crime Lab testified as to his qualifications and 
identified Exhibit 3 as methamphetamine. (TR-36) 
Exhibit 3 was admitted into evidence. (TR-38) 
After the State rested Defendant put on his defense. His first witness was 
George Larsen, an inmate at the Grand County Jail. (TR-41) Mr. Larsen testified that on 
March 27 he overheard a conversation in the booking room of the Grand County Jail in 
which Deputy Lammert stated that Exhibit 3 had been found on the lower shelf of the 
booking area. (TR-43, -44) This was in complete contradiction of Deputy Lammert's 
testimony on cross examination that it was found on the top shelf. (TR-27, -28) 
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The Defendant testified in his own behalf. He testified he knew that when he came 
to Court on February 5, he knew he was going to be incarcerated. (TR-47) He testified 
that he was knowledgeable about methamphetamine on February 5, 1997, and had used it 
prior to that. (TR-52, -53) He quit using methamphetamine at Christmastime 1996. 
Mr. Disch testified he had always used a "yellow rock" type methamphetamine called 
"lemon drop". (TR-54) He would not have used or had a small pink rock. (TR-54) He had 
never possessed methamphetamine in a container such as Exhibit 3, did not have 
possession of Exhibit 3 on February 5, 1997, and did not knowingly or intentionally have 
or possess Exhibit 3 in the Grand County Jail. (TR-55, -56) 
E. MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE. 
The above Statement of Facts accurately reflects the record in this matter. All 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict can be summarized as follows: 
1. Deputy Zane Lammert was a deputy with the Grand County Sheriffs 
Office on February 7, 1997. He had training and some degree of "expertise" in the 
function of booking persons into the Grand County Jail on thai date. 
2. On February 7, 1997, he had knowledge of the booking area of the Grand 
County Jail. He believed the area to be free of contraband prior to his booking of 
Mr. Disch. The booking area is within the exterior boundaries of the Grand County Jail 
building. 
3. During the process of booking Mr. Disch into the jail, Deputy Lammert 
discovered a ball of paper, Exhibit 3, which later was identified as methamphetamine. 
Deputy Lammert believes all possibilities other than that Exhibit 3 came from Mr. Disch 
are excluded. Access to the jail and booking area is restricted. 
Defendant will argue below why the above is legally insufficient to support the 
jury's verdict. However, the following points must be noted. 
8 
1. Deputy Lammert never saw Exhibit 3 in Mr. Disch's possession. 
2. Access to the booking area was non-exclusive, as best evidenced by 
Mr. Larsen's testimony and presence there. 
3. There was a large amount of "stuff in Mr. Disch's pockets. 
4. Mr. Disch had quit using methamphetamine at least a month prior to 
February 7, 1997. 
5. Mr. Disch knew he was going to be incarcerated when he reported to Court 
that day. 
6. Mr. Disch had never seen or used pink methamphetamine, preferring a 
yellow substance. 
7. Mr. Disch was never confronted by Deputy Lammert with the controlled 
substance. 
8. Mr. Disch had no methamphetamine on his person and did not intend to 
possess it within the Grand County Jail building. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Even considering that all of the marshalled evidence is true, reasonable minds 
must contain a doubt as to whether Mr. Disch knowingly possessed methamphetamine in 
the Grand County Jail building. The evidence was insufficient to convict him. 
II. The State is barred from filing a new action after dismissal of the prior case by 
Utah Brickey standards and due process. There was no new information available to the 
prosecution from the time of the Preliminary Hearing in 9717-26. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: The evidence at trial was insufficient to find Mr, Disch guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
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Mr. Disch concedes that the burden is on him when challenging the sufficiency of 
the verdict to marshall all of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions, and 
show how, after making all reasonable inferences therefrom, the same is legally 
insufficient to support the trial court's conclusions, State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314, 317 
(Utah App. 1992), citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). See also 
State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1225. 
Defendant's position is two-fold. First, the methamphetamine was not connected to 
him. Second, even if he did bring the methamphetamine into the jail, it was 
unintentionally and without knowledge. 
There is no question that methamphetamine was found in the booking area of the 
Grand County Jail where Mr. Disch had been briefly and recently. However, the 
connection between Mr. Disch and the contraband is so tenuous that no reasonable mind 
could find he had possession of it. 
Deputy Lammert never saw the methamphetamine in Mr. Disch's possession. 
Although there may be some question of when it was that Deputy Lammert found the 
methamphetamine in relation to when Mr. Disch was there, the fact that Deputy Lammert 
never confronted Mr. Disch with it argues for the conclusion that it was discovered after 
Mr. Disch had left the area. 
Additional questions as to Defendant's possession or not are raised by the fact that 
access to this area was non-exclusive. This is evidenced by the prior booking of another 
inmate that day and verified by the presence of inmate Larsen in that area at a later date. 
There is evidence the methamphetamine was found in an area of the booking counter 
other than where Deputy Lammert testified it was found, and in an area where it could 
have been prior to Mr. Disch's presence and undetected by Deputy Lammert. When 
considered together with the fact that Mr. Disch had not used methamphetamine for a 
considerable period of time before his arrest, knew he was going to be incarcerated that 
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date, and the methamphetamine was a type he had never seen before, the conclusions 
becomes inescapable that the controlled substance was not his and he had not transported 
it into the building. 
The second consideration asks this Court to determine that even if Mr. Disch did 
transport the methamphetamine into the jail building, he was unaware of its presence and 
t 
lacked the intent necessary for conviction. 
U.C.A. Sec. 76-2-101, set out in the Text of Constitutional and Statutory 
Provisions section, supra, sets forth reasonable standards and requirements for finding 
criminal culpability in Utah. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly... 
(Since the charging document, the Information, requires "knowingly and 
intentionally" possession of a controlled substance while inside the exterior boundaries of 
property occupied by a correctional facility or public jail, the other statutory culpability 
factors are irrelevant.) 
Section 76-2-103 U.C.A., also set forth in the Text of Constitutional and Statutory 
Provisions section, defines the Utah standards for finding "intentionally" and 
"knowingly". Intent requires that it be Defendant's conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. Knowingly requires the Defendant to be aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
It is impossible to see what evidence supports the conclusion or verdict that 
Defendant intended to bring methamphetamine into the Grand County Jail building or 
knew that he was doing the same. To the contrary, the evidence is that he intended to quit 
drug use, had never seen this type of methamphetamine before, much less knew it was in 
his possession, and given that he knew he was going to be incarcerated, would knowingly 
have it on his person on that date. Remember that the substance was packaged in a way 
that did not suggest it was a container of methamphetamine. If the concession is made 
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that Mr. Disch did bring the substance inadvertently into the jail, intermingled with the 
large quantity of "stuff' in his pockets, this Court must still determine if Mr. Disch's 
conviction meets the required culpability standards of intent or knowledge. It does not 
and should be reversed. 
Point II: The State is barred from filing a new action after dismissal of the prior 
case by Utah Brickey standards and due process. 
The Utah Supreme Court has placed a limit on the State's ability to refile criminal 
charges where those charges have been previously dismissed. State v. Brickey, 
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). In Brickey the charges were originally dismissed at 
Preliminary Hearing for insufficient evidence. Unlike Brickey, in the instant case 
Defendant was bound over but the State later determined it could not obtain a conviction 
on the crime for which it had obtained its bindover. The due process considerations of 
Brickey are applicable. 
In Brickey, the Supreme Court first considered the purpose of a Preliminary 
Hearing, the standard of proof and the fact that jeopardy does not attach at the hearing. 
While the Court found that double jeopardy was therefore no bar to subsequent 
prosecution, it expressly held that the State is not therefore free to refile charges. State 
due process precludes refiling the same charge unless the State shows that it has new or 
previously unavailable evidence, or that other good cause exists for refiling. Brickey at 
647. In cases such as the present, the Court adopted the Jones standard from Oklahoma, 
requiring the prosecutor to show new or previously unavailable evidence that has surfaced 
or other good cause before refiling. The Court also set forth procedures for refiling which 
were not followed in the instant case. See also State v. Johnson. 782 P.2d 533 (Utah App 
1989), State v. Jaeger. 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994), discussing the strict requirements of 
Brickey, at 55. 
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Public policy consideration, as expressed in Brickey, support Defendant's position. 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing, as well as Defendant's right to speedy trial, clearly 
guarantee defendants from unwarranted prosecution and protect his or her right to have 
serious allegations disposed of efficiently and expeditiously. If the State has erred, the 
defendant should not be called upon to suffer. Nor should he or she be exposed to 
additional incarceration due to the State's error. 
Although Defendant has not obtained copies of the transcript of the Preliminary 
Hearing in Case No. 9717-26 (Disch I), a review of the Statement of Probable Cause 
signed in that case for Defendant's arrest (see Addendum A), together with a review of 
the Ruling on Motion to Dismiss or Quash Bindover (R-19, -20) show that Defendant was 
prejudicially recharged in 9717-230, the instant case (Disch II). 
In Disch I, the prosecutor charged Defendant with a violation of the same 
underlying Statute as Disch II, enhanced by his presence in a restricted area. Footnote 1 
of the Ruling clarifies what this restricted area was: 
The prosecutor alleged that defendant possessed methamphetamine in the jail. 
Under the prosecutor's theory, a jail is a public parking lot or structure as defined 
in Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(vii), Utah Code, thus making possession a second-degree 
felony. The trial judge had ruled in another case that "public parking lot or 
structure" means "public parking lot" or "public parking structure". Therefore, not 
all public buildings are drug-free zones. 
The only difference between Disch I and Disch II is that in Disch II the 
enhancement is now Defendant was within the exterior boundaries of property occupied 
by a correctional facility or public jail. See Footnote 2 of the lower Court's Ruling: 
The prosecutor's present theory is that defendant possessed methamphetamine 
within the exterior boundaries of property occupied by a correctional facility or 
public jail under Section 58-37-8(2)(c), Utah Code. 
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There is no new evidence in Disch II that was not available at the time ;of the 
Preliminary Hearing in Disch I. Deputy Lammert's knowledge of Mr. Disch's activities 
was the lynchpin of the State's case. Surely Deputy Lammert, as well as the State, knew 
those activities had occurred within a building housing a jail. 
In the instant case, the reason the State sought a dismissal in Disch I was not 
because the prosecutor had underestimated the evidence necessary for a bindover, but 
because the prosecutor made a mistake of law. The due process considerations of Brickey 
still apply—Defendant should not be prejudiced or his right 1o a speedy disposition of 
charges against him delayed as a result of prosecutorial mistake. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard for reversal for insufficient evidence is ''only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime of which he 
[or she] was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), cited in State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). Bracketed material in original. The Defendant 
respectfully suggests his case meets exactly those standards and respectfully requests that 
his conviction be reversed. 
Brickey due process considerations bar Defendant's reprosecution or conviction. 
His conviction should be reversed on that basis. 
DATED this H < ^ day of January, 1999. 
WILLIAM iTk^UUp 
Attorney for Appetbaqt l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the foregoing Opening 
Brief of Appellant to Christine Soltis, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, 
160 E. 300 S., Heber Wells Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, postage prepaid, this 
H i ^ day of January, 1999. 




WILLIAM L. BENGE, #0282 
Grand County Attorney 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, Utah 84 53 2 
Telephone (801) 259-1324 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : No. 
vs. : 
STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
LYNN KENT DISCH, : 
DOB: 09/26/63 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss . 
COUNTY OF GRAND ) 
On the H day of February, 1997, personally appeared 
before me Det. Curt Brewer, who being by me first duly sworn, on 
his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a detective with the Grand County Sheriff's 
Department. 
2. On February 5, 1997, Deputy Zane Lammert contacted 
me about a suspected controlled substance he found on the person 




3. Deputy Lammert told me that on February 5, 1997, 
he was called up to the Seventh District Court to take custody of 
Disch. He said he escorted Disch into the jail booking area and 
had him empty all of his pockets out onto the counter top. 
Deputy Lammert said that while doing the property inventory, he 
found a small piece of paper rolled up into a small ball among 
the contents Disch took out of his pocket. He said he unrolled 
the paper and found a small rock like substance inside. 
4. Deputy Lammert contacted me and I did a nik test 
on the rock. The results showed positive for methamphetamine. 
5. Disch possessed the alleged controlled substance 
inside the courthouse which is a drug free zone. 
Det. Curt Brewer 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this «J_ 
February, 19 97.* 
My commission^expires: Notary Public 
06 -2-7 -*?£- Residing at Moab, Utah 
day of 
C jUtvE 6. ftAVAKftt. ? 
, < 7 ^ i > $ \ M7MY PUBLIC -STATE of UTAH j 
{£<S^§frY*$ GRAND COUNTY j 
\°A <KS8 /c/ 1 '-5 EAST CENTER %5 M0A8, UT 84632 
COMM. 6XP, 8.27-98 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LYNN KENT DISCH, 





THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT, WILLIAM L. BENGE, states 
on information and belief that the defendant committed, in the 
above-named county, the crimes of: 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE 
ZONE, a SECOND DEGREE FELONY, in violation of Section 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the 
said defendant, on or about February 5, 1997, at Grand County, 
State of Utah, did knowingly and intentionally possess a 
controlled substance, to-wit: methamphetamine; and defendant did 
possess said controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a facility 
in violation of 58-37-8(5) which makes this offense a second 
degree felony. 
This information is based upon evidence received from 
the following witnesses: Deputy Zane Lammert, Det. Curt Brewer. 
DATED this II day of February;) 1997 
William Lr~6enge 
Grand County Attorney 
ADDENDUM C 
WILLIAM L. BENGE, #0282 
Grand County Attorney 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: 801-259-1324 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
LYNN KENT DISCH, 
Defendant. 
No. 9717-026 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff moves the Court to dismiss this matter for 
the reason it will be refiled with a different enhancement. 
DATED this [u day of SeplQkber, 1997. 
\W\l 
WiTliam L. Benge 
Grand County Attorney 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (jf) day September, 1997, 
I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the above to: 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
69 E. Center St. 
Moab, Utah 84532 
2 
ADDENDUM D 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COIJPT 
r—.- , 
F,L£r
 S~P 2 i 199/ 
3N 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LYNN KENT DISCH, 
Defendant. 
No. 9717-026 
ORDER TO DISMISS 
This matter came before the Court on motion of 
plaintiff. The Court being fully advised, hereby 
ORDERS that this matter be dismissed. 




District Court Judge 
•CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <2S> day of September, 
1997, I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the above to the following: 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
69 E. Center St. 
Moab, Utah 84532 
